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Introduction




The introduction surveys the philosophical literature about shame. Philosophers 
have long been troubled by the dual nature of shame. On the one hand, it seems 
to be an emotion that is central to the development of virtue. On the other hand, 
it arises in cases that have no obvious moral import and it can hinder rather 
than help moral progress. Much of the philosophical literature has aimed to find 
a way to reconcile these two sides of shame by explaining away or de- 
emphasizing one of the two sides. This introduction raises questions about the 
viability of those strategies and provides an outline for the rest of the book.
Keywords:   shame, sex, nudity, moral emotion, moral psychology, shamelessness
Agony. Who would have thought that my name and fortune
Could square so well together! My name is Ajax:
Agony is its meaning.
—AJAX (Sophocles 1969: 23)
Shame is a jekyll-and-hyde emotion with two faces.1 The first face is a positive 
one. Looking at this face, we can see an emotion that plays a valuable role in 
moral life. As moral philosophers frequently argue, shame is something of a 
moral companion to guilt.2 While we feel guilt about particular wrong actions 
and choices, shame has a broader scope. We feel shame when we fail to be the 
people that we hope or strive to be. Shame understood this way is a valuable 
emotion of self-assessment. It not only extends to aspects of our characters 
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rather than just to our actions and choices; it also helps us in the task of moral 
self-improvement. If we feel shame when we fail to live up to our values, we can 
use those painful feelings as a warning and a reminder. As Williams argues, a 
moral emotional landscape without shame is an impoverished one because it 
envisions “the moral self as characterless” (1993: 95). If we care (morally) about 
what sorts of people we are and what sorts of people we ought to be, then the 
first face of shame shows it to be a central part of moral life. (p.2)
But shame also seems to have another face—a negative one.3 We might feel 
shame when we fail to live up to our ideals, but we also feel shame about being 
low class or uneducated. We feel shame about being ugly. We feel shame about 
being seen naked, performing bodily functions, masturbating, and having sex.4 
Victims of violence and abuse feel shame about their victimization, people feel 
shame when they struggle with mental illness and addiction, and people who are 
disabled feel shame about their disabilities.5 We feel shame about things that 
seem to have nothing to do with our moral character, and we also feel shame 
mostly in front of other people.6 If this is true, shame seems to be more about 
threats to our reputations or social standing than about our moral failings.7 
What is perhaps most troubling is that shame seems to bear a connection to 
violence.8 People who feel shame sometimes engage in self-destructive behavior, 
and they sometimes engage in aggressive behavior toward others. Given these 
sorts of cases, not all philosophers are keen to defend shame’s place in moral 
life. Those who see this face of shame suggest that we ought to be wary of being 
too approving of it—they warn that its positive face comes at a high price.9 Some 
philosophers go further and suggest that we would make moral progress if we 
got over feelings of shame.10 The negative face of shame shows an emotion that 
is not complimentary to or necessary for virtue, but instead an emotion that is 
contrary and possibly destructive to it.
The two faces of shame give rise to two philosophical puzzles. First, why is 
shame so varied? Is it because there are two kinds of shame that correspond to 
each of the faces?11 Are both of these descriptions picking out shame, or is one 
of them picking out some other emotion? This first  (p.3) puzzle is a conceptual 
one: how should we understand the nature of shame given these divergent 
views?12 The second puzzle is about the moral status of shame. The positive face 
seems to suggest that shame is a valuable moral emotion. Yet the negative face 
seems to suggest that it is an emotion that is contrary to morality. How do we 
end up claiming that the same emotion is both moral and immoral?
The aim of this book is to tackle both of these puzzles. As I will argue, I believe 
previous ways of solving the mystery of shame have been unsuccessful to 
varying degrees. In this introduction, I give a very broad sketch of those 
attempts, which I then discuss in more detail in the chapters. For now, let me 
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provide a broad overview of the ways that moral philosophers generally try to 
reconcile the two faces of shame.
1. Reconciling the Two Faces
Moral philosophers have tried different strategies to try to reconcile the two 
faces of shame, but those strategies have downsides or odd consequences. Those 
who wish to defend the first face usually try to show that the second face is 
somehow mistaken. Consider, for instance, cases where we feel shame about 
being ugly. Short of plastic surgery, there is very little we can do about our 
appearances. We are for the most part simply born looking how we look. As 
such, we might think that feeling shame about our appearances is irrational. 
This response suggests that the shame we feel about being ugly is not really 
shame. But why should this be the case? Notice that we typically do not make 
these claims about other emotions. For example, survivor’s guilt is puzzling on 
many common philosophical accounts of guilt, but few people would deny that 
survivor’s guilt is guilt.13 Even if we admit that the negative face of shame is 
irrational somehow, such a conclusion does not entail that it is not shame after 
all. Further, even if these cases of shame are irrational, why should we then 
exclude them from our philosophical accounts of shame? We have, as Deigh 
writes, no reason to “regard the class of rational or reasonable experiences of a 
given emotion as privileged for the purposes of conceptual inquiry” (1983: 237). 
The claim that we can safely exclude the negative face of shame because it is 
irrational betrays an assumption that only the best or proper cases of an emotion 
are important. Yet when we are trying to do thorough conceptual  (p.4) analysis 
of an emotion, the decision to only consider the “good cases” seems arbitrary.
This strategy looks even more puzzling once we realize that it forces us to 
conclude that the most familiar cases of shame are by and large irrational. For 
example, most philosophers acknowledge that it is actually quite common to feel 
shame about things that are beyond our control.14 For those who want to defend 
the positive face of shame, this presents a problem, since feelings of shame are 
supposed to be a morally valuable form of self-assessment that helps us improve 
ourselves. How are we supposed to improve what we cannot change? If we claim 
that these cases are irrational, then we can maintain that “normal” feelings of 
shame can still help us improve ourselves. But if we commonly feel shame about 
things that are beyond our control, this means most common cases of shame are 
irrational. It seems at the very least odd that a philosophical account of an 
emotion ends up having to claim that some of the most paradigmatic examples of 
an emotion are irrational.
Philosophers who instead emphasize shame’s negative face can reconcile the 
two faces by arguing that we do not really need the positive face of shame. First, 
they argue that the downsides to the negative face outweigh the benefits of the 
positive face. Even if we concede that shame can sometimes play a positive role 
in our lives, that positive role does not mitigate the bad effects enough to justify 
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maintaining our liability to it. Nussbaum, for instance, claims that shame leads 
to a harmful pursuit of perfection and invulnerability (2004: 336). Even though 
she acknowledges that shame can sometimes be constructive, she believes it 
may still have this “concealed narcissism” at its core (216). As such, we ought 
not encourage others or ourselves to feel it. Second, those who are wary of the 
negative face of shame might conclude that whatever good work shame does can 
be done by other less problematic emotions. Kekes, for example, argues that 
instead of feeling shame, we should respond to our failures with “anger at 
ourselves, resolution to improve, the desire to make amends, and a quest for 
understanding why we did what we did” (1988: 292). If all of these responses 
are available and they are not as negative as shame, perhaps we are better off 
feeling them instead.
One of the downsides to this strategy, however, is that it has no ready 
explanation for why we think shamelessness is a serious fault or vice. If  (p.5) 
we would be better off without shame, then why are shameless people so 
obnoxious? There seems to be something wrong with the person who never feels 
shame. Consider Mason’s example from Graham Greene’s novella “Doctor 
Fischer of Geneva, or the Bomb Party” (2009: 408). Dr. Fischer has a circle of 
acquaintances called the “Toads.” The Toads try desperately to ingratiate 
themselves to Dr. Fischer by allowing him to humiliate them in exchange for 
gifts (409). They “allow their fingers to be crushed in the claws of live lobsters … 
or don bibs and eat cold porridge” (409). The Toads’ desire to ingratiate 
themselves to Dr. Fischer is shameless; they will sink to any level in order to get 
a gift or a favor. Examples like this seem to support the positive face of shame: if 
the Toads had a stronger sense of shame, they would not stoop to such lows. It 
appears that shame would prevent them from failing so spectacularly to live up 
to some ideals of character. Those who emphasize the negative face of shame 
might be right to point out its potential for damage, but the Toads illustrate the 
downside of having no shame at all.
The philosophical literature is dominated by these two faces of shame and 
attempts to reconcile them. The question seems to be, Which face is the true 
one? Is it the positive face that helps us realize our moral failings and improve 
ourselves? Or is it the negative one that causes so much pain and self- 
destruction that we would be better off without?
2. The One Face of Shame
I will argue that neither face is the true face of shame because shame does not 
have two faces; it just has one complex face. This book aims to contribute to the 
philosophical literature on moral emotions by presenting a unified account of 
shame. I will argue that, while we might feel shame in a wide variety of cases, 
we only feel one shame. The shame that we feel about our moral failings is the 
same shame we feel about being low class or ugly. Unlike those who emphasize 
the positive face of shame, I will argue that there is no need to think that the 
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troubling cases of shame are irrational. I will not try to deny or explain away 
shame’s dark side; doing so would require turning it into something that it is 
not. Unlike those who emphasize the negative face of shame, however, I will 
argue that shame is a valuable moral emotion. Acknowledging and accepting 
that shame has a dark side does not then mean we would be better off without it. 
There is no good shame or bad shame, false shame or real shame, natural shame 
or moral shame. There is just shame—a varied and complex emotion that plays 
an important role in moral life. (p.6)
I think the previous ways of trying to reconcile the two faces of shame go wrong 
in different ways. Those who emphasize the positive face of shame and those 
who emphasize the negative face of shame have approached shame in a way that 
is overly moralistic. Let us start with the positive attempts. Moral philosophers 
who work on moral emotions face two tasks. First, we need to give a good 
account of emotions as people experience and live them. Second, we need to 
explain how those emotions fit into moral life. In the case of shame in moral 
psychology, often accomplishing the second task has come at the cost of the 
first. Moral philosophers who want to defend the positive face of shame have 
tried to rescue it from those who only see its negative face—those who think it is 
a holdover from a world of warriors and puritans. Many moral philosophers have 
argued (successfully in several ways) that shame still belongs in modern moral 
psychology. The problem is that the account of shame that emphasizes the 
positive role that it plays in moral life is built on a conceptual analysis that does 
not fit how we experience shame. We convince the skeptics by appealing 
primarily to shame’s uncontroversial and ultimately moralized form.
Nowhere is this strategy more apparent than when we consider shame about our 
bodies. With a few notable exceptions, the shame we feel about sex and nudity is 
virtually absent from the literature on shame in moral psychology.15 Those who 
concentrate on shame’s positive face typically rely on examples that are either 
moral failings or relatively innocuous harms: people feel shame for stealing 
candy (Mason 2009), lying (Manion 2002), for displays of ingratitude (Murphy 
1999), “making a vulgar gesture” (G. Taylor 1985: 59), lacking musical ability, 
cheating, and behaving cowardly (Rawls 2003). I do not mean to suggest that we 
do not feel shame about these sorts of things. Yet shame about nudity is 
considered one of the classic cases of shame. It is of course true that shame 
about sex and nudity is largely culturally determined. There are many places 
where public nudity is acceptable to varying degrees, but that there are different 
standards across cultures does not mean there are no standards. And why 
should we shy away from examining these cases just because they are not 
universal? We might risk making our accounts of shame overly narrow by 
focusing on culture-specific examples. But shame about nudity is not so 
particular to the United States that we can exclude it, and we run the same risk 
of an overly narrow account by not including it. If we take the task of giving a 
good conceptual analysis of emotions as seriously as we take the  (p.7) moral 
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task, we cannot simply leave out one of the most familiar experiences of shame. 
The problem is that shame about nudity and sex seems to have no obvious moral 
import. Alternatively, it seems morally problematic: we typically think shame 
about sex and nudity is unhealthy or prudish. Since this shame experience 
appears to undermine the conclusion that shame is a morally valuable emotion, 
those who wish to defend shame as a moral emotion are then faced with the task 
of explaining why we feel this way. To do so, they might argue that shame about 
sex and nudity is irrational.16 As I pointed out above, this strategy requires us to 
claim that one of the most recognizable experiences of shame is irrational.
In their widely cited paper, D’Arms and Jacobson identify what they refer to as 
the moralistic fallacy. The moralistic fallacy occurs when we conclude from the 
fact that “it would be wrong or vicious to feel an emotion” that said emotion is 
therefore irrational (2000: 69). The move that the defenders of the positive face 
of shame make is, I suggest, a version of this fallacy. This version of the fallacy 
goes this way: we wish to conclude that shame is a moral emotion, but some 
cases of shame appear to be either immoral or non-moral. We then decide that 
these instances of shame are not really shame at all, but something else—false 
shame, irrational shame, or normal shame gone wrong somehow. As such, we 
tend to “correct” shame experiences that do not fit the philosophical model we 
have constructed. The problem is that we are “correcting” the way people often 
experience this emotion. This method allows us to maintain the claim that shame 
is a positive moral emotion, but that claim comes at the cost of providing a 
complete conceptual analysis.
Those who emphasize the negative face of shame also take a moralistic 
approach, but from a different direction. They make certain presumptions about 
our moral emotional lives that also do not do justice to its complexities. Those 
who point out shame’s negative face assume that if an emotion is dark and 
damaging we would be better off without it. They further assume that we can 
(with effort no doubt) temper, downplay, and ultimately root out feelings like 
shame. Here I do not wish to dispute the claim that it is possible for us to get 
over feelings of shame—maybe it is and maybe it is not, but I will grant that it is 
at least possible for us to try. The point is not whether we can or cannot get rid 
of shame; the point is that on this view it is better to not have negative emotions. 
Shame is not the only  (p.8) emotion that we treat this way; emotions like envy, 
hatred, and spite have a similarly bad reputation—they are the “nasty” emotions 
in moral psychology.17 We are often told that we would be better, more virtuous, 
and healthier if we rid ourselves of these feelings once and for all. Countless 
books, workshops, seminars, and (now in true twenty-first-century fashion) apps 
give step-by-step guides for banishing negative thoughts and feelings from our 
lives. The rejection of shame, I suggest, is partly motivated by this overly 
moralistic attitude toward our emotional life. That is, those who argue against 
shame equate a virtuous moral psychology with a positive moral psychology. 
What grounds do we have for thinking that this is true? Those who point out the 
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negative face of shame typically do not address this question. Their method is 
simply to show how bad shame is, and those reasons are meant to motivate us to 
undertake the project of trying to get over it. The claim that our moral emotional 
lives should be on the whole positive is taken for granted. The fact that an 
emotion has a dark side does not automatically license the conclusion that it is 
not morally valuable unless we already assume that morally good emotions have 
to be positive. We do not always have to feel good in order to be good.
The account of shame that I argue for in this book aims to take shame as it is— 
as we experience it in all its variety—and provides both a good conceptual 
analysis of it and an explanation of its role in moral life. Our moral emotional 
lives are complex, and the experience of shame is likewise complex. My hope is 
to do justice to that complexity by showing how an emotion with a dark side can 
still be a moral emotion.
3. Scope and Aims
My primary interest in this book is shame as a moral emotion. Shame is not a 
new topic in philosophy, but the views that I present and discuss here are mostly 
(though not exclusively) in the contemporary analytic tradition. Although I will 
talk about some of the historical views of shame, I do so largely to illustrate the 
roots of the contemporary views that I identify. Working out the details of, for 
example, Aristotle’s views about shame with care and attention would be a book 
unto itself. Rather than do a partial job of that, I have chosen to focus on 
accounts of shame from approximately the last forty years. I am taking what Bell 
calls a “bottom-up” approach to moral psychology: bottom-up approaches begin 
 (p.9) “with a detailed investigation of [emotions] themselves and consider what 
role these emotions might play in a minimally acceptable morality” (2013: 274). 
As such, I will not assume any particular moral framework at the outset. I will 
start with shame considered on its own terms and work from there into moral 
questions. Although I will not assume any particular moral theory from the start, 
my approach is most compatible with broadly Kantian commitments.
Moral emotions are also not a new topic in philosophy, though they have also 
enjoyed a renaissance in the last fifty years or so, thanks in large part to the 
work of Iris Murdoch.18 When it comes to morality and the emotions, there are 
two main debates. The first is about whether emotions on the whole ground or 
give rise to moral judgments.19 The second is about how precisely to understand 
the nature of moral emotions—whether they are cognitive or non-cognitive, 
whether they are more like perceptions, more like beliefs, or more like 
judgments, or whether they are something altogether different.20 I will leave 
aside the first debate entirely. My main focus in this book is about shame’s 
relationship to moral life rather than about what role emotions generally play in 
moral life. With regard to the second debate, I will skirt its edges. Providing a 
philosophical account of the nature of one moral emotion does not necessarily 
have implications for the nature of all emotions. Also, the account of shame that 
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I provide could be compatible with either a cognitivist or non-cognitivist account 
of emotions. As such, I will not try to settle whether shame is cognitive, non- 
cognitive, or whether it is some mix of the two. When we examine the 
philosophical literature on this debate, I think we find much blurrier boundaries 
than we would have thought, but that is a topic for a book about the nature of 
emotions generally. I will, however, discuss different ways of understanding what 
makes an emotion moral (or immoral) in chapter 4.
Philosophy does not have the market cornered on moral emotions. Psychologists 
have long been working on emotions and on shame. I will  (p.10) discuss some 
psychological literature (both clinical and empirical), but not extensively. In part 
this is due to a lack of expertise that most moral philosophers face: I can read 
scholarly articles in psychology, but I am not versed enough in the literature to 
read them at a critical level. In my view, this lack of expertise has caused 
philosophical literature on the emotions to frequently err on the side of 
scientism. Moral philosophers sometimes treat empirical work on the emotions 
as authoritative rather than as one possible way of approaching the topic. The 
primary reason that I engage minimally with the empirical literature is because 
of my commitment to providing a conceptual analysis of shame that captures the 
phenomenology of shame. How do we know how people experience shame? I 
think we know that by how people describe those experiences. Transcripts from 
therapy sessions, memoirs, and fictional descriptions give us detailed accounts 
of people’s shame experiences from their own perspective. I do not mean to 
suggest that the first-person point of view is unassailable, but I think it is a 
mistake to assume that people must be confused or irrational just because their 
experiences of shame do not fit the conceptual models we have constructed. 
Although I do not think first-personal accounts can decide philosophical 
questions, I use them to raise doubts about the success of some of the dominant 
views about shame.
Additionally, some empirical studies about shame presuppose theoretical 
commitments. Many of the empirical studies about shame use the Test of Self- 
Conscious Affect (TOSCA). This test is a questionnaire primarily used to 
distinguish guilt and shame responses.21 The person taking the test is given 
scenarios and then asked to select from a list of answers which one best 
describes her response to the imagined scenario. Since the main aim is to 
distinguish guilt from shame, the scenarios are already moralized. For example, 
here is one scenario: “You make a big mistake on an important project at work. 
People were depending on you and your boss criticizes you” (Tangney and 
Dearing 2002: 211).22 As such, the test assumes a definition of shame that aligns 
with one of the views I argue against in the book: shame is an emotion we feel 
when we fail to live up to ideals. The account of shame I am arguing for in the 
book is an alternative to this definition. Although I think there are some 
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important insights we gain from examining these studies, I will take them as a 
starting point for the conceptual discussion rather than as the focal point.
 (p.11) 4. Chapter Sketch
To accomplish the task of giving a unified account of shame, I take a closer look 
at its dark side. In the first chapter, I introduce the story of Ajax to help illustrate 
three philosophical positions on shame: the traditional view, the naturalistic 
view, and the pessimistic view. Putting the pessimistic view aside until chapter 4, 
I begin an exposition of the traditional view and explain why it might be a 
tempting account of shame as a moral emotion. I then introduce the dark side of 
shame and show that the traditional view cannot account for it. Given these 
concerns, I introduce the naturalistic view as an alternative. I then show how the 
naturalistic view cannot explain how shame might be morally valuable. I end 
chapter 1 with a question: can we provide an account of shame that shows how it 
can be morally valuable while at the same time making sense of its dark side?
In the second chapter, I return to Ajax to point out of a feature of the story that 
often goes unnoticed. Ajax sees no problem with the idea of becoming a 
murderer, but the shame of looking like a raving madman drives him to suicide. 
Ajax is one illustration of a common phenomenon: people either prefer being 
violent to feeling shame, or their feelings of shame are alleviated by acts of 
aggression. This link has been suggested by some empirical research and 
clinical work in psychology, and there are numerous literary examples that 
illustrate it. I argue that neither the traditional view nor the naturalistic view 
can explain why we sometimes prefer violence to shame. I then argue that a 
close examination of the connection between violence and shame will reveal 
important aspects of the experience of shame more generally. I end chapter 2 by 
highlighting two features of shame that are present in the cases where shame 
and violence are linked. In these cases, (a) people feel shame about some aspect 
of their identities that they do not control, and (b) that aspect of their identities 
makes them self-conscious about how they come across to others.
In chapter 3, I provide my own account that tries to make sense of the dark side 
of shame. I argue that shame is an experience of tension between one’s identity 
and one’s self-conception. Those things about which we feel shame are part of 
our identities, but they are not part of our self-conception. When we feel shame, 
we feel defined or overshadowed by some aspect of our identities that we do not 
necessarily see as part of who we are. If I feel shame about my face, for 
instance, it is because I feel as though my face overshadows the rest of me or 
that the only thing that others notice about me is my face. I show how this 
account explains the common responses to shame, such as wanting to disappear. 
It also explains why we often  (p.12) feel shame about things we cannot control; 
our bodies, our families, our race, and our class are all parts of our identities 
that we may nonetheless prefer not to see as fundamental to how we define 
ourselves. Hence we are caught between acknowledging them and feeling 
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alienated from them. The account I provide can also accommodate the moralized 
cases that the traditional view uses to support its own definition of shame. 
Finally, thinking of shame as a tension between identity and self-conception can 
make sense of the link between shame and violence.
Chapter 4 answers the question of shame’s moral value. Even if my account of 
shame as a tension between one’s identity and self-conception can accommodate 
the dark side of shame, does it make sense of the idea that shame is a moral 
emotion? Here I return to the challenge of the pessimistic view. Advocates of this 
view point out that shame causes self-destructive behavior and damaging forms 
of suffering to many people. People with mental illness, drug users, rape and 
abuse victims, and queer individuals often experience shame in ways that are 
troubling and harmful. The pessimistic view argues that these individuals ought 
not feel shame and that getting over shame (both as individuals and as a society) 
would be morally progressive. Against this view, I argue that shame is a morally 
valuable emotion, but not in the traditional sense.
To show that shame is valuable, philosophers typically argue that episodes of 
shame can be morally permissible. Determining an emotion’s moral 
permissibility involves examining the circumstances under which we should feel 
it and what objects it ought to be directed toward. But the traditional way of 
categorizing emotions as moral is not successful in answering the pessimistic 
view’s challenge. Even if there are cases when shame is morally good to feel, the 
pessimistic view can still claim that we would be better off without it—at most, 
they can argue, shame is morally neutral. By contrast, I argue for the moral 
value of shame by presenting a different way of categorizing moral emotions. I 
argue for a constitutive view of moral emotions. On this view, an emotion is 
moral because a liability to it is constitutive of valuable moral commitments or 
features of moral psychology. In the case of shame, a liability to shame is morally 
valuable because it shows that we do not take our self-conception as the final 
authority on the kinds of people we are. We can see this clearly by examining 
what is wrong with shamelessness. The shameless person takes her own self- 
conception to be the determining factor in her self-estimation. In this way, shame 
prevents us from ignoring unflattering features that undermine our own positive 
self-estimation. A liability to shame shows that we are open to moral criticism 
and that we recognize the moral standing of others. (p.13)
If feelings of shame are morally valuable, does it follow that we should try to 
make people feel shame? In chapter 5, I discuss how shaming punishments have 
increased in popularity and how social media platforms such as Twitter and 
Facebook have become mediums for public shaming of bad behavior. Can these 
practices be justified? I distinguish between three different practices that are all 
labeled “shaming”: invitations to shame, shaming, and stigmatizing. I argue that 
invitations to shame can be justified in certain circumstances, but that shaming 
and stigmatizing cannot be justified. The primary argument in favor of shaming 
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and stigmatizing is that both practices are powerful tools to change behavior. 
This conception of shaming as a tool relies on the premise that the practice itself 
is morally neutral—shaming, in other words, can be used for good or ill, and as 
long as it is used for good, it is justified. I argue against the claim that shaming 
as a practice is morally neutral. Shaming is the practice of holding up the flaws 
of others for public scorn, and I argue that this practice is unjustified even when 
it is done for noble reasons. When we shame, we attempt to define another 
person’s identity in social life, but this is an illegitimate exercise of power over 
another moral agent. In shaming, we take ourselves to be moral educators who 
are immune to the flaws that we point out in others. Engaging in shaming 
wrongly presumes that we have moral clarity and that we are permitted to try to 
enforce virtue in our fellow moral agents. The fact that shaming is morally 
suspect, however, does not entail that we would be better off feeling less shame 
or no shame at all.
I want to give the last word to John Deigh, who succinctly sums up the choice we 
are faced with when it comes to shame. He writes,
Since we are capable of bringing our emotions under rational control, we 
may regard our feeling a specific emotion as incompatible with our moral 
principles and so try to make ourselves no longer liable to it. Alternatively, 
we may regard this emotion as essential to our humanity and so revise our 
principles. (1983: 238)
We can come to the conclusion that shame is in conflict with the moral 
commitments that we have or should have, and so try to get rid of it. Or we can 
discover that shame is essential to our moral lives and change how we see 
ourselves and our moral commitments. I will argue for the latter choice. Shame 
is complex and messy, but so is moral life. We can feel shame excessively. It can 
be ugly, violent, and destructive. But getting over shame would not be moral 
progress because shame is not a toxin, a holdover, or a byproduct. We are liable 
to it because we are moral agents, and we would not be good moral agents 
without it.
Notes:
(1) Indeed, the subtitle of one of the most recent works on shame is “The Faces 
of an Emotion” (Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2012).
(2) We can see claims like this in Taylor 1985; Gibbard 1990; Williams 1993; 
Murphy 1999; Rawls 2003; Mason 2009; Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2012.
(3) Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni divide this into two “dogmas” about shame: 
that it is inherently heteronomous and that it is an “ugly” emotion. They discuss 
these two dogmas at length (2012: 21–66).
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(4) Williams (1993), Velleman (2001), and Dolezal (2015) discuss shame about the 
body.
(5) Maibom discusses victims of violence (2010). Shame is a common theme in 
addiction memoirs; see Knapp 1999; Wurtzel 2002; Jamison 1995. Psychologists 
show this link as well; see, for example, Mason 1991; O’Connor et al. 1994. For 
shame and mental illness, see Hinshaw 2007; Horan et al. 2008; MacAulay and 
Cohen 2014. Shame about disability can been seen in Grealy’s autobiography 
(1994) and in Nussbaum 2004.
(6) Goldie (2000), Gibbard (1990), and Maibom (2010) make this point.
(7) Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni argue against this view (2012). Kekes argues 
that this is true of shame (1988).
(8) Psychologists have purported to show this link, see Tangney et al. 1992; 
Tangney 1995; Miller 1985; Gilligan 1997; Scheff and Retzinger 1991. For 
counterarguments, see Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2012.
(9) Manion makes arguments like this (2002, 2003).
(10) Isenberg (1949), Kekes (1988), and Nussbaum (2004) all make this 
argument.
(11) Rawls introduces the distinction between natural and moral shame (2003: 
390).
(12) As Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni put it, “[W]e must wonder how it is possible 
to reach such radically contrasting assessments” about an emotion (2012: 3–4).
(13) Greenspan addresses survivor’s guilt (1992).
(14) Deigh (1983), Kekes (1988), D’Arms and Jacobson (2000), Velleman (2001), 
Nussbaum (2004), Mason (2009), Maibom (2010), and Deonna, Rodogno, and 
Teroni (2012) all point out that we frequently feel shame about things over which 
we have little or no control.
(15) Augustine (1998a), Williams (1993), and Velleman (2001) take this kind of 
shame seriously.
(16) Mason argues that shame like this is not “properly focused” (2009: 418). 
Gabriele Taylor thinks this is false shame (1985: 163). Some philosophers argue 
that shame about sex or nudity is about failing to live up to a value, such as the 
value of modesty (Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2012) or privacy (Velleman 
2001). I argue against this possibility in chapter 1.
(17) Both de Sousa (1987: 316) and Solomon (2007: 101) call them this.
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(18) Bagnoli argues convincingly that Murdoch was the earliest and loudest 
champion for making moral philosophy about one’s inner moral life, which had 
been largely ignored by logical positivism (2011: 3–4).
(19) Of course, the arguments that emotions ground morality are indebted to 
Hume. For examples of contemporary sentimentalists, see Gibbard 1990; Prinz 
2004, 2007.
(20) Oakley has one of the best overviews of what is at stake in this discussion 
(1992). Of course, even using the terms “cognitive” and “non-cognitive” is 
fraught because there are different ways of conceiving of each of these. For 
example, some cognitivists think of emotions as judgments (Nussbaum 2004; 
Solomon 2007), but some think emotions merely involve judgments (G. Taylor 
1985). Some non-cognitivists think of emotions as perceptions (D’Arms and 
Jacobson 2003), but some think of them as construals (Roberts 1988). To call a 
view cognitivist or non-cognitivist is thus not so straightforward.
(21) For a thorough explanation of the TOSCA, see Tangney and Dearing 2002.
(22) For all the scenarios, see Tangney and Dearing 2002: 207–213.
